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ABSTRACT: 19'h-century thinkers Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, and SOren Kierkegaard each posit struggle as a foundation within their philosophies.
Whereas the flrst two see struggle as a fundamental condition of human consciousness, I
argue that Kierkegaard alone offers a way to escape this struggle.
In the works of many l9'h-century
philosophers, I have noticed a common
theme. There seems ever present, in much
of the work, a shared notion of struggle.
This notion seems mainly to arise within
the conflnes of human consciousness. In
fact, the notion of struggle is pervasive in
contemporary thought as well and could
simply be inherent to human nature. This
paper, however, maintains specific focus
on the notion of struggle as brought to
light by a sampling of works by three rel-
evant l9'h-century philosophers, namely,
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, and Spren Kierkegaard. I
look into some of the foundational claims
made by these thinkers to see what can be
discovered about their reasoning and what
sense can be made of this seemingly un-
avoidable aspect of the human condition.
The goal is to see what relations can be
made among their ideas and where con-
flict and contradiction may arise. Once
these elucidations have been made, I ar-
gue my own stance on the notion of strug-
gle both within the confines of human
consciousness and on the outset to explain
my arguments in terms of human behav-
ior. I argue that there is one thinker among
the three covered who offers a methodol-
ogy of practical application in a person's
life in terms of human nature as opposed
to the formulations made by the remaining
two, whom I consider to offer only general
descriptions of human consciousness.
German idealism was sparked by the
work of J. G. Fichte. He introduced the
notion of struggle in a manner that was
meaningful and influential to his contem
poraries as well as those who came after
him. A notable scholar of German ideal-
ism, Wayne Martin, provides much de-
tail about Fichte's conception of struggle
in chapter six of his book ldealism and
Objectivity : Understanding Fichte's Jena
Project. He opens by explaining Fichte's
claims in reference to the primacy of prac-
tice. Martin's interpretation thereof is that
"philosophical theories are reflections of
practical interests and moral character"
(l l8). I take this to mean that, in the way
an artist's work can be seen as a reflection
or insight into her feelings, the work of a
philosopher reflects his pragmatic beliefs
and code of morals. Martin argues that
there is this idea of striving that "lies at the
heart of Fichte's conception of the prima-
cy of practice" (119). Details of Fichte's
view about striving will come to light in
subsequent pages, but before his view is
unraveled,I must give a little background
information on Fichte's claims.
Martin argues that Fichte is very con-
cerned with elucidating his notion of the 1,
or the ego. The I is not a thing or an it but
a doing. The I is un-experienceable and
unknowable. The I is the thinking of the
thinking of the thinking, ad infinitum.
Opposite the I, we have the other, or
the non-ego. The I is constantly striv-
ing, infinitely striving in fact, to break
the boundaries of the other, which is the
Iimiting portion of human consciousness.
An example of this would be the desire to
walk through a wa1l. This desire, as en-
visioned by the ego, should be possible.
However, the other will always limit the
possibility of doing such a thing in nature.
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So, think of the I as inflnite or absolute, as
the thesis. Conversely, think of the other
as finite, as limited by the understanding
of a physical reality. It is the antithesis.
The compelling nature of the I and its con-
stant battle with the other is what Martin
calls the striving doctrine (lI9).
So, though we are fundamentally flnite
creatures, our true nature as driven by the
I is to "strive for absolute self-determina-
tion" (129). Of self-determination, I take
Martin to mean what the person shouldbe
able to do but cannot, due to limitations
enforced by the other. "Our infinity, our
autonomy, our absoluteness, is preserved
as an account of our inescapable but also
unattainable telos" ( I 28-9). Self-determi-
nation is the I's striving to walk through
walls, and the other is the limiting factor
that makes such a goal impossible. It is
important to note that the other is not the
wall but our understanding of the wall. We
have a dualism, a conflict, and possibly a
contradiction. I explore the contradiction
shortly, but what is important for now is
to ensure that the reader understands this
notion of striving.
Martin argues that a large portion of
Fichte's work, possibly the initial spark
that set into motion, is a defense of Im-
manuel Kant's postulates. Martin reminds
us of Fichte's claim that striving is of the
highest order in human beings and without
it no object is possible (119). I take "ob-
ject" in this context to mean speciflcally
the goal of the I to transcend the other. But
as we have already seen, it seems that, due
to the persistence ofthe other, the goals of
the I are unattainable. But are they?
Upon close inspection. we can see a
subtle but important connection between
Fichte's and Kant's projects. Martin ex-
plains that Kant's work seems to point
toward a primacy of practical philosophy.
"Kant's strategy showed how practical
philosophy might provide something that
theoretical philosophy seeks but fails to
attain: a rational justification of claims
about experience-transcendent reality"
(Martin, 120). For both Kant and Fichte,
there is a goal specific mode of primacy.
For Kant, it is the practical over theoreti-
cal philosophy. For Fichte, it is the I over
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the other. Whether either can champion its
opponent is unclear, but what is clear is
that for both there is a struggle. Further-
more, the struggle itself seems to stem
from both practicality and instinct rather
than from theoretical philosophy.
So where can the I and the other f,nd
common ground? Is there a compromise?
The answer seems to be grounded in
morality. Martin remarks that "the goal
of moral striving, according to Fichte's
obscure claim is a unity of the intelli-
gent I [antithesis] and the self-positing I
[thesis]-a unity attained by making the
object of intelligence dependent on the
l" (123). Though the point is somewhat
elusive, I take Martin to mean by this
that there exists a synthesis between the I
and the other. Fichte's synthesis is shown
by Martin ultimately to be belief in God
(123). Theistic belief is no longer meant
to be seen as a conditioz of moral action
but rather to be "identified with moral ac-
tion" (Martin,723).That one acts morally
is indicative of one's belief in God. Here,
we can see intention and behavior clearly
aligned with the abilities and objectives
of the other, which are influenced by an
infinite deity in a cooperative effort that is
not seen in the relationship between the I
and the other.
Martin spills a considerable amount of
ink to illuminate what many of Fichte's
readers, and possibly Fichte himself,
might have seen as a contradiction. Re-
ferred to specifically is that, if the oth-
er does exist "and the striving doctrine
would resolve it, it is not clear that this
suffices to establish the striving doctrine"
(Martin, 129). Martin's reading of Fichte
seems to suggest that taking the striving
doctrine for granted, the autonomy of the I
is retained even though its goals are unat-
tainable. So why does Fichte grant autono-
my to the I in the flrst place (Martin, 129)?
We can gain some insight into this matter
when we consider a person's legacy.
We can see one's legacy as being
something that is autonomous and ev-
erlasting. We can say with certainty that
George Washington existed from 1132 to
1799. Though his colporeal existence as
the antithesis of George Washington van-
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ished upon his death, it seems that his the-
sis remains. We learn about him in school;
he is represented on the U.S. quarter-dol-
lar. In this and any other case of a person's
legacy, it seems that there is an autonomy
and inflnite quality to one's otherwise fi-
nite existence.
I take Fichte not to be offering the striv-
ing doctrine as an attempt by the I to solve
the problem of the other but rather that the
striving doctrine itself is what amounts to
the nature of human consciousness. Fichte
does not seem to be saying that one or the
other will win but rather that there just is
a struggle between the two. I argue that if
Fichte is right, then the implication is that
the striving of the I to overtum the other
is not dependent on any sort ofresolution.
Fichte merely elucidates what is happen-
ing within the scope of consciousness and
nothing more. Further, it could be a ma-
jor element of our basic survival. Think of
what it means to be finite, to know with
certainty that you will die someday. This
may be the greatest truism in philosophy
or any other discipline for that matter. Tak-
ing this into consideration, we can clearly
see that each day we continue to exist, sim-
ply in virtue of our existence, we struggle
against our fundamental finite nature.
There is, however, another supposed
contradiction to be addressed. Martin
raises a good point when he asks, "What
kind of being is capable of counterposit-
ing" (131)? Counterpositing is explained
as the very positing that the I does of the
other (Martin , 132). lt is a deeper dissec-
tion of the striving principle. Not only do
we have an etemal struggle between the
absolute, infinite I and the limited, finite
other, but it seems troublesome for the
former to posit the latter in the flrst place.
How could the notion of the limited, finite
other even manifest itself to the absolute,
inflnite I? For there to be a struggle be-
tween the two in the first place, there must
be a recognition of one from the other.
There are countless examples of finite
beings positing the existence of an infinite
deity, so it makes sense to ask how the re-
verse could be possible. For example,just
step into your local church or synagogue.
In these places of worship, you have a vast
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number of people who claim without a
shadow of a doubt that there exists an eter-
nal, infinite deity, a creator and surveyor
ofthe universe and everything in it. Those
with this sort of faith also believe that this
eternal ilfinite being is aware of and has
influence on its followers. So, through this
instance we can see that, though difficult
to prove apodictically, there may be at
least one case in which the contingent rec-
ognizes the necessary andvice versa.
Martin neatly bookends the chapter by
returning to the concept he opens with,
primacy of practice. To remind the read-
er, primacy of practice refers to the claim
"that philosophical theories are reflections
ofpractical interests and moral character"
(Martin, 118). Other scholars no doubt
have objected to this argument, but Martin
offers an interesting example to illustrate
its value.
He calls it the "ontogenetic analogy."
This analogy equates to an infant's require-
ment of food for its survival. Not only does
it need food, but it feels discomfort when
hungry. In turn, the infant does something
to get it. When an infant is hungry, "It
cries, it struggles, it sucks" (Martin, 139).
Martin notes that these behaviors are ex-
tremely primitive and instinctual. "They
do not depend on an ability to represent
the world as other or to act intentionally"
(139). Inquire of a baby his stance on the
striving doctrine or counterpositing; see
how far that gets you. Martin thinks that
this demonstrates something of an innate
or instinctual practicality, which adds an
incredible amount of foundational support
to Fichte's claims. "What it [the ontoge-
netic analogyl shows is that there is a kind
of striving that does not itself presuppose
theoretical representation" (Martin, 139).
My take on this, and seemingly Mar-
tin's as well. is that Fichte's claims about
striving are not meant to serve as theories
at all; rather, they are meant to explain the
nature of human beings. We struggle. We
seem to be constantly at odds with what
we should be able to do but cannot. But
how can we see this as a reflection of a
practical interest and moral character?
Consider the all too familiar instance
of running late for work and encounter-
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ing gridlock trafflc on the freeway. You
know that the distance from home to of-
fice is, say,25 miles. Driving at 60 miles
per hour should get you there in approx-
imately 28 minutes. However, there is
something blocking you from achieving
this simple goal, namely, a massive col-
lection of slow-moving vehicles inhib-
iting your path. You may think of taking
backroads to bypass the obstacle, but what
if many other drivers had the same idea?
This course of action would become just
as fruitless as the original one. Your the-
sis tells you it should be possible to get to
work on time if only the antithesis were
not acting as the limiting factor. This cre-
ates frustration and resentment. These
emotions are initially directed at others on
the road and, if one is honest, eventually
towards oneself for not leaving earlier.l
Though Fichte clearly demonstrates
a duality of consciousness, it is another
thinker who argues for an absolute de-
pendence upon the I by the other and vice
versa. G. W. F. Hegel provides an account
of struggle between the I and the other in
his famous argument of the master and
servant. The section is opened with the
notion of recognition of one by the other.
..SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS EXISTS IN
ITSELF AND FOR ITSELF, IN THAT,
and by the fact that it exists for another
self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only
by being acknowledged or 'recognized"'
(Hegel,399). How can something exist in
and for itself but only via recognition of
some other consciousness? It is my con-
tention that not unlike Fichte, Hegel, too,
is alluding to an eternal struggle between
the ego and the non-ego. The ego yearns
to exist as an infinite, absolute spirit but
can only be manifested tangibly in a finite
manner as the non-ego. In what Hegel re-
fers to as the double self-consciousness,
he explains that "it [ego] does not regard
the other [non-ego] as essentially real,
but sees its own self in the other" (Hegel,
399). So, I take this opening statement to
be nothing more than an explication that
the ego and the non-ego are interdepen-
dent. Ontologically speaking, the surviv-
al of one entity requires the survival of
the other.
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Before direct analysis of the master/
servant argument, I would like to high-
light what I feel to be the zenith of He-
gel's notion of struggle, namely, the
obliteration of one at the hand of the
other: "Insofar as the other's action, each
aims at the destruction and death of the
other" (Hegel,402). So, though it is clear
that there exists a struggle between the
ego and the non-ego, it is actually one of
life and death. It turns out, though, that
no matter how strong the desire to do so,
one cannot kill the other.
Think of it like a quarter. On one side
we have George Washington's acting as
the ego, and on the other we have the
bald eagle's acting as the non-ego. Both
Washington and the eagle want to exist
independently but cannot. The survival
of one is contingent upon the survival of
the other. It is not as if splitting the coin
bisectionally would give us two 12.5 cent
pieces. There exists either the dualistic
nature ofthe quarter or nothing at all. "In
the same way each must aim at the death
of the other, as it risks its own life there-
by; for that other is to it of no more worth
than itself' (Hegel,403). By killing one's
only brother, one loses his own identity
as brother.
So, we now come to the master/servant
(or lord and bondsman) argument. There
a-re two characters in this short drama.
First, we have the master as played by the
consciousness that exists for itself, or the
ego. Then, there is the servant, that other
consciousness that is the manifestation of
the latter in thinghood (existence in the
world). "The master relates himself to
the servant mediately through indepen-
dent existence, for that is precisely what
keeps the servant in bond; it is his chain,
from which he could not, in the struggle,
get away, and for that reason he proves
himself dependent, shows that his inde-
pendence consists in his being a thing"
(Hegel, 405). The master displays his
dominance over the servant by being that
which inflnitely animates the finite other.
The very life, and consequently the role
of the servant, is contingent upon the exis-
tence of the master, but we soon find that
this goes both ways.
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The master, or ego, is always initial-
ly defined by Hegel as existing solely for
himself: "he is the negative power without
qualiflcation, a power to which the thing
[non-ego] is nothing, and his is thus the
absolutely essential action in this situa-
tion, while the servant's is not so, his is
an unessential activity" (Hegel,406). By
"without qualification," I take Hegel to
mean "without need of qualification," for
the master's existence is necessary. Con-
versely, the servant is meant only to exist
via qualification made by the master. The
seryant's existence is contingent on the
necessary self-positing existence of the
master, but it turns out that the very act
of serving is his saving grace. "Through
work and labor, however, this conscious-
ness of the servant comes to itself' (He-
gel,408). It is actually in virtue of the ser-
vant's subordinate role as handed down by
the master that the servant comes to have
the seH-consciousness meant to be denied
by the master. So, it is the service of the
bondsman that gives legitimacy to the
lord. If the servant is to be nothing with-
out the master, what is the master to be
without the servant? Seemingly, he is to
be nothing. In A Commentery on Hegel's
Logic, John and Ellis McTaggart had this
to say about Hegel's dialectic:
Hegel, has proved, no doubt, that the
Outer is now identical with the In-
ner. And it may perhaps be said that,
though this is not the same as the de-
nial of all multiplicity, yet it involves
it. For, as against the Outer, the Inner
was looked on as emphasising the
unity of the content, while the Outer
emphasised the multiplicity. [158]
I argue that the implication made by
these authors drives the notion of interde-
pendence home in an interesting fashion.
They claim that in virtue of the master's
need for the servant, the former is actu-
ally identical with the latter. Though a
seeming contradiction to the notions of
necessary versus contingent existence.
it gives us something more to consider
when attempting to understand Hegel's
argument.
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Finally we turn to a more subtle notion
of struggle as provided by S6ren Kierke-
gaard in his book Pzrity of Heart Is to Will
One Thing. Kierkegaard brings the notion
of struggle to light in a different way but
with similar intrinsic tenets. He shows
how there exists absolutely a struggle to
define what it is that a person should will.
The battle here is not between the I and
the other but rather a question of willing.
Though he alludes to the notion of strug-
gle as the other thinkers did, his version
is varied in that it is without question a
normative claim about human nature and
not what it stems from. Kierkegaard is
not telling us what we are; he is telling us
what to do. He will ultimately argue that
there is only one thing worth striving for,
and in so doing, our will can be in perfect
alignment with the will of God.
I argue that, though Fichte and Hegel
provide us with interesting explanatory
facts about human nature, Kierkegaard
gives us a way in which we can use per-
sonal struggle to guide our application of
practical interest and moral character.
In technical scope, Purity of Heart
is meant to serve as a prerequisite study
before making confessibn of one's sins,
but not as we typically recognize, e.g., in
a booth with a clergyman. Kierkegaard
scholar and professor of law at UCLA,
Stephen R. Munzer, writes, "Purity of
heart depends on repentance and confes-
sion. Kierkegaard does not have in mind a
penitent's auricular confession in a booth
of his or her sins to a priest who then
absolves the penitent. Instead he writes
about private, secret confession made
prior to communion services on Fridays,
Saturdays, and Sundays in the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in Denmark" (317).
The message that Purity of Heart de-
livers is more deeply entrenched in the
discovery of how to align one's will prop-
erly with the good. What follows is an
attempt to discover what the good is and
how Kierkegaard suggests we do so.
As is often taught in both ancient and
contemporary divinity, the proper use of
the will is grounded in its alignment with
that of God, or as Kierkegaard puts it,
"the Eternal." A seeming instantiation of
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this notion can be found in the introduc-
tion of the book. Kierkegaard begins the
study with what I take to be a prayer, or a
petition to God if you like. The first estab-
lished concept is that humanity's knowl-
edge is essentially nothing without God.
"What is all he knows, vast accumulation
though it be, but a chipped fragment if he
does not know Thee!" (Kierkegaard 3l).
With this notion in place, he begins his re-
quest: "So may Thou give to the intellect,
wisdom to comprehend that one thing; to
the heart, sincerity to receive this under-
standing; to the will, purity that wills only
one thing" (31). Here we are introduced to
Kierkegaard's one thing.
Kierkegaard's object of willing is two-
fold in that it is both a request made of
God and requires constant attention and
perseverance in its acquisition. Otherwise,
its necessity is easily forgotten. It is allud-
ed to that in the passage of a human's day,
the request for such may be made at dawn,
but by dusk the intention may easily es-
cape. One must keep the willing of one
thing ever present in one's understand-
ing. Before giving a detailed description
of this one thing, I must flrst explain what
Kierkegaard sees as barriers to its willing.
Though seemingly obvious, Kierkeg-
aard makes it clear that a variety of goals
is not one goal. In the search for one goal
that leads to the good, we might explore
the vast number of goals that could do so.
Is it precise focus on work, family, coT-
munity, or oneself that constitutes the
willin! of one thing? In selecting one of
them, and giving it all of our attention, we
may be disregarding the others, and this
will ouicklv be recoqnized as a contradic-
tion do the pursuit if the good, which is
what this one thing seems to be alluding to
in the first place. "And not only this; since
each of these considerations readily be-
comes too abstract in character, is he not
obliged as the next step to attempt to will,
one after the other, each of these goals in
order to find out what is the single thing he
is to will, if it is a matter of willing only
one thing?" (Kierkegaard,54).It is made
clear that this would be a pursuit of an
endless nature and would not lend itself to
the one thing we should be willing.
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Accordingly, there is a consideration
that Kierkegaard makes explicit. Any one
of myriad goals, though established with
the best of intentions, which humanity
may wish to centralize could only be of an
earthly, not heavenly, nature and thus not
permissible. "This is indeed a lamentable
fact; but there is a wisdom which is not
from above, but is earthly and fleshly and
devilish" (Kierkegaard, 62). So it seems
that whether we establish one or many
goals as the object of desire in terms of
the one thing we should be willing, they
all fail the acid test in terms of purity of
heart for Kierkegaard. His resolution on
this matter is both clever and precise. He
inspires his reader by demonstrating the
fallacy of selecting one or many candi-
dates that the finite human mind could
contemplate in the first Place.
So, what are we to do? How are we
to discover this one thing and what is its
specific nature? Though not made clear
by Kierkegaard, we can say that it is the
good. The good cannot be any flnite goal,
and it cannot be a combination of sever-
al such goals. It, in fact, cannot be any
of these things, as it has been established
that they are all of only an earthly virtue.
It is my contention that the one thing to
be willed can be summed up by a single
word, "intention."
When one forms an intention, one cen-
tralizes her thoughts upon not only a given
goal but upon how the goal is to be.ob-
iained. We can always, in a manner given
to us by the Eternal, yet in a finite way, uti-
lizethe good in intention. Intention serves
as a way to follow one's conscience,
which I argue that Kierkegaard would de-
cree as being God given.If I align my will
with that of approaching all of my affairs
with the intention of good, then I am accu-
rately following my conscience. The work
being done here is constant and strenuous.
I must always be grounded in self-exam-
ination.
We are shown that, ultimately, the path
to having such an intention is to be oneself,
or in Kierkegaard's words, to live as an in-
dividual. It must be recognized, though,
that what is being asked by his study is
not about one specific individual such as
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you or I. "No, it is the serious question, of
what each man really is according to his
eternal vocation, so that he himself shall
be conscious that he is following it; and
what is even more serious, to ask it as if
he were considering his life before God"
(Kierkegaard, 184).
To will one thing is not, as many de-
vout followers may claim, to align one's
will with God's. Nor is it to make a spe-
cific request that God somehow inject
the divine will into our understanding.
To will one thing is to live properly and
attentively as an individual and, through
the process of self-examination in all our
affairs, to rely upon our pure conscience.
For though our conscience may be seen
as God given, we, however, are the ones
at the helm. This effectively clears the
path for humans to have free will while
still making room for the deterministic
assumption that that which gives us free
will is granted by God.
In looking at these three thinkers, there
seems to be more in common between
Fichte and Hegel than either has with Kier-
kegaard. There is, however, at least one
author who went to considerable lengths
to elucidate a connection between Kierke-
gaard and Hegel.In the introduction to his
book, Kierkegaard's Relations to Hegel,
Recon si d e red, John Stewart writes:
While many scholars would agree
that much of Kierkegaard's rich and
diverse thought is best understood as
being in a sort of dialogue with He-
gel's philosophy, few have done much
to establish the concrete points of
contact in a historical fashion. Thus,
for anyone even mildly familiar with
Kierkegaard, the value of an inves-
tigation of his relation to Hegel and
German idealism should be obvious
and in no need ofjustiflcation. There
are any number of reasons why this is-
sue, so central to understanding Kier-
kegaard, has not been treated more
often or more rigorously than it has.
First, in a number of his books, there
are several passages in which Kierke-
gaard assumes a tone of animosity to-
wards Hegelian philosophy. [1]
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My reasoning for including this pas-
sage is to show that I am not the only one
who finds merit in the grouping of Kierke-
gaard with Hegel to explain a unified con-
cept. And though Stewart's comparative
analysis of the two goes into more detail,
I argue that the specific comparison of the
two in terms of this notion of struggle is
justified. Furthermore, since Hegel's phi-
losophy (especially in dialectical formula-
tion) seems to ride the coattails of Fichte,
I argue for ajustiflcation ofgrouping these
three thinkers.
The reader may be asking, though,
what does Kierkegaard's project have to
do with Fichte's or Hegel's? Here I return
to the original point of the essay, which is
to elucidate the notion of "struggle" and
its implications for human nature. In their
dialectic analysis of consciousness, Fichte
and Hegel attempt to explain what makes
us human. Kierkegaard, however, tells us
what to do with the struggle, how to apply
it in our lives. Though I argue that follow-
ing German idealistic methodology in the
confines of the dialectic can shed some
light on why we behave the way we do, I
would like to offer two flnal examples to
expand on the notion of struggle and hu-
man nature.
Imagine you are in love. I do not mean
that you have strong feelings for or feel
you would be paired well with someone. I
mean that you are deeply and inescapably
in love with someone. This is a story as
old as humankind. Now, imagine that love
is unrequited. The object of your desire
does not share your conviction. The ego
outright demands that he be with you, but
the non-ego will not permit it. How would
you behave in this scenario? In an active
approach, you might continually pester the
person to meet your demands to the point
of annoyance escalating to the level ofre-
straining orders. Or, you may choose sim-
ply to internalize your despair, becoming
more and more depressed in light of the
non-ego's limitation of the ego's desires.
In this scenario, we can see both Fichte
and Hegel shaking their heads saying, "I
told you so." Thus, the matter reaches a
dead end. They do not tell us how to deal
with this situation but rather just revel in
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their understanding of the inherently pain-
ful nature of the human condition. Here,
Kierkegaard offers us a way out. Follow-
ing his line of reasoning, we can say that
we should follow our conscience. If we
listen to it carefully and realize our subjec-
tive truth, we are better equipped to deal
with the struggle: move on.
In a similar scenario, a heroin addict
strongly desires to feel the same high as
was offered upon the first injection but
can never quite get to that point. Ex-
treme tolerance and eminent addiction
will always be the limiting factor. There
is perhaps no greater a display of behav-
ioral changes made than in this instance.
So, the dialectic again does a nice job of
explaining the struggle and its origin in
light of human nature, but it is Kierke-
gaard's purity of heart, the willing of one
thing, that offers another type of behav-
ioral modification.
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In recognizing perhaps the strongest
human instinct there is, namely, surviv-
al, it might turn out that in following the
addict's conscience, she decides to seek
help and to get clean. Though this process
is both painful and difficult, it may turn
out to be the most gratifying and fruitful
endeavor of her 1ife. This willing of one
thing could lead to her ability to regain her
position in society and to be of use to oth-
ers who suffer in the way she did.
It is my contention that our behavior
can only stem from our consciousness.
I argue that the dialectic gives strong ev-
idence for this as I have shown in many
instances throughout this paper, and my ul-
timate claim is that Kierkegaard's method-
ology is one that can offer a practical appli
cation necessary for true happiness. Fichte
and Hegel show us why we are what we
are, whereas Kierkegaard shows us how to
become what we are meant to be.
Note
1It is here that we might see the duality of consciousness manifesting in behavioral and perceptual
alterations. I explore this notion more in the conclusion.
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